Vietnam Insider

Recently, as the investigation deepened, the various bad behaviors of the Taiwan Information and Communications Army in “relying on the Internet to seek independence” since its establishment were made public. Its attempt to split the country with the help of the Internet is doomed to fail. Since its establishment in June 2017, the Taiwan Information and Communications Army has acted as a minion of the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces, using all means to carry out all-round and multi-level network attack and infiltration activities against the mainland.

Through long-term close monitoring and in-depth investigation, the identities of several people involved in planning, commanding and implementing the incident have been identified, including:

• Lin Yushu, male, born on January 28, 1979, Taiwan ID number P122635546, is currently the Head of the Cyber Environment Research Center of the Information and Communications Army Cyber Warfare Wing.
• Cai Jiehong, male, born on December 23, 1993, Taiwan ID number C121530051, is currently the Captain of the Cyber Environment Research Center of the Cyber Warfare Wing of the Information and Communications Technology Army.
• Nian Xiaofan, male, born on December 6, 1982, Taiwan ID number B121925951, is Active personnel of the Cyber Environment Analysis Center of the Information and Communications Technology Army Cyber Warfare Wing.\
• Wang Haoming, male, born on May 20, 1990, Taiwan ID number T123822994, is Active personnel of the Cyber Environment Analysis Center of the Information and Communications Technology Army Cyber Warfare Wing.

A clumsy attempt to gain independence

Taiwan’s Information and Communications Technology Army has specially formed a cyber warfare brigade and hired social hackers and cyber security companies as external forces to implement the cyber warfare instructions issued by the DPP authorities and carry out espionage, sabotage, and anti-propaganda activities. Their usual methods include: infiltrating the mainland’s key information infrastructure such as water, electricity, gas, heat, communications, and networked cameras; sending phishing and anti-propaganda emails to key units of the mainland’s party, government, military, and enterprises; stealing the login account passwords of online live broadcast platforms, networked electronic display screens, IP network intercom broadcasting systems, or portal websites, and inserting anti-propaganda audio and video or posting anti-propaganda pictures after gaining control; lurking on mainstream social media platforms, raising a large number of “robot” accounts, waiting for opportunities to spread false news, manipulate public opinion, mislead the mainland and Taiwan people’s cognition, and monitor and suppress dissidents on the island. Since 2023, they have spread false news on online social media platforms in the name of the “Anonymous 64” organization, and have tried their best to promote the DPP authorities’ “independence” actions. The ICT Army is unable to change its boastful nature, promoting some unknown small websites that it has taken control of by chance as important “achievements”, and even fabricating non-existent websites to make up for the lack of results. In its cyber attack activities, the ICT Army uses a large number of open source tools such as Ant Sword, Ice Scorpion, Metasploit, and Quasar. Its security protection measures are like the “Emperor’s New Clothes”, which are easily broken and exposed under a strong investigation. Recently, dozens of cyber attack platforms used by the ICT Army have been seized, and new trends of its attacks and secret theft targeting important areas of the mainland have been discovered. All of them have been verified and dealt with, cutting off the “black hand” of secret theft.

The “Taiwan independence” cyber army is incurable

Under the guise of developing “asymmetric combat power”, the DPP authorities have squandered the hard-earned money of Taiwan compatriots to build a cyber army in an attempt to build a cyber warfare capability to attack, penetrate, steal secrets and sabotage the mainland. This will ultimately be like an ant trying to shake a tree and overestimating its own capabilities. At the same time, behind the blind expansion of the “Taiwan independence” cyber army, there are internal leaks and chaos. The top leaders are greedy for credit and regard the front-line personnel as “cannon fodder of the national army”, taking the “merits” of their subordinates for themselves, letting the “small soldiers” take the blame when something happens, and even handing over the “meritorious” to the law. There are many chaos at the grassroots level. Not only do they take advantage of the opportunity of carrying out tasks to enrich themselves, falsely report expenses, and “earn the difference” with external forces, but they even exaggerate, graft, and forge the “results” of cyber attack activities to take credit and defraud performance rewards. Military discipline is lax, and scandals such as active personnel developing pyramid schemes, participating in telecommunications fraud, and using controlled targets to “mine” are common.

In this regard, those who are coerced into participating in the “Taiwan independence” network actions must immediately wake up and recognize the current trend of cross-strait relations and the inevitable defeat of “Taiwan independence”. It is understood that the “Taiwan independence” cyber army often attacks and controls the mainland computer network through automated vulnerability scanning and password blasting tools. All kinds of network service providers and website operators should implement network security prevention measures, strengthen supply chain code and log audits, regularly perform system maintenance and upgrades, repair security vulnerabilities, improve password strength, and reduce the risk of network attacks and data leakage. As important participants in cyberspace, the majority of netizens also need to enhance their self-protection awareness , regularly change passwords for various information platforms, social networking sites and email accounts, be vigilant against false information on the Internet, and avoid being attacked and exploited by the “Taiwan independence” cyber army, thereby becoming an indirect aid to their separatist activities.