Vietnam’s Aging Crisis Could Define Its Economy for the Next 20 Years

“Growing old before getting rich” threatens productivity, social security, and growth—forcing Vietnam to rethink labor, healthcare, and the role of AI.

Vietnam is approaching a demographic turning point that could shape its economy for the next two decades. As the population over 60 grows rapidly, the country faces a complex challenge defined by three overlapping realities: aging before achieving high income levels, insufficient pension coverage, and longer lifespans without corresponding gains in health. Together, these trends are creating structural pressures that extend far beyond demographics—touching productivity, inequality, and long-term growth.

Unlike advanced economies where older citizens often remain economically active, Vietnam’s “silver economy” is constrained. Most people over 66 are unlikely to keep pace with rapid technological change or continue working at scale, limiting income generation in later life. At the same time, aging without good health is pushing up healthcare costs while reducing discretionary spending on travel, leisure, and consumption. As a result, both pillars of a consumption-driven silver economy—work and spending—are structurally weakened.

Yet the shift is also opening new opportunities. Demand is rising for home healthcare services, professional medical facilities, and nursing home models across income segments. These sectors could become growth engines if regulation, investment, and workforce training evolve quickly enough.

The ripple effects are already visible. Insurance and financial planning are seeing renewed demand as the so-called “sandwich generation”—people aged roughly 30 to 50—must simultaneously support aging parents and their own children. However, international experience, particularly from East Asia, suggests that simply importing Western-style financial planning models can backfire, morphing into high-risk investment behavior rather than genuine risk protection.

At the macro level, productivity growth will increasingly rest on a shrinking base of workers. Upskilling is often presented as the solution, but time scarcity makes it unrealistic for many. In practice, automation, bots, and AI systems are likely to substitute for human upskilling—not because they are superior, but because they are cheaper. This cost-driven acceptance of lower-quality AI output is becoming a defining paradox of aging societies.

Vietnam’s large informal economy compounds the risk. With only an estimated 5–10% of informal workers covered by social insurance, a rapidly aging informal sector could create sudden fiscal and social pressure when today’s workers can no longer earn. Family-run businesses, a backbone of employment, may close as there is no successor generation willing or able to take over—leaving workers jobless and accelerating consolidation without job retention.

Meanwhile, sectors long fueled by spending on children—education, childcare, consumer goods—are expected to slow from double-digit growth to single digits as birth rates decline. Forecasts across multiple industries may need downward revision.

The social consequences are equally stark. Some workers may opt out entirely, joining a “lying-flat” generation overwhelmed by financial and emotional burdens. Others will take on multiple side jobs, recreating versions of high-pressure work cultures seen elsewhere in Asia. In parallel, employers—armed with AI alternatives and a backlog of resumes—are becoming more ruthless in performance expectations.

This is the paradox of an aging, automated society: fewer people carry more responsibility, yet receive diminishing rewards. Inequality widens not just between rich and poor, but within ever-narrower elite tiers. Aging societies also tend to see reduced appetite for large-scale disruption, as stability is prized over risk.

Vietnam is not alone. Countries like South Korea and parts of Europe are already grappling with similar dynamics—but they had far higher income levels before aging set in. The difference is timing.

If Vietnam does not address these structural issues within the next decade—through pension reform, healthcare investment, productivity strategy, and smarter use of technology—it risks locking itself into a low-growth, high-pressure equilibrium that will be far harder to escape once the demographic window closes.